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THE IDENTIFICATION OF TRAINING NEEDS FOR DEVELOPING AERONAUTICAL DECISION
MAKING TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR MILITARY PILOTS






This research applies Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003)
analyzing aviation accidents in the R.O.C. Air Force between 1978 and 2002 in order to identify the training needs of
aeronautical decision-making (ADM).  There were 523 accidents associated with 1762 human errors.  The results
indicated that decision errors had been involved in 223 (42.6%) accidents.  Without in-depth analysis of decision
errors in military aviation, it is unlikely to identify precisely the training needs of ADM and the nature of the training
content required to prevent the decision errors in aviation (Patrick, 2003).  This research found that ‘decision-errors’
has significant association with lieutenant pilots and at landing phase, and pilots at the rank of ‘cadet’ (experience)
flying ‘training aircraft’ (tools) practicing ‘close pattern’ (missions) at ‘landing phase’ (working environment) with
the highest probability of accidents.  It is important to understanding the junior pilots were very vulnerable to the
decisions and supervisions made by high-level management.  As Dekker (2001) described that human errors is
systemically connected to the tools, tasks, and operational and organizational environment of operators, it is important
to clarify the role of decision errors in pilot’s tools, tasks, experience, and operating environment in military aviation
in order to develop effective ADM training programs for military pilots.
Introduction
Identification of ADM Training Needs
Decision making performance in the aviation domain
is a joint function of the features of the tasks and the
pilots’ knowledge and experience relevant to those
tasks (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993).  Orasanu (1993)
has pointed out that no evidence exists to support the
development of training techniques to improve
all-purpose decision making skills.  There are six
different component skills involved in the six different
types of decisions.
For improving aviation safety, it is important to
identify the training needs for ADM.  The
Interservices Procedures for Instructional System
Development (IPISD, Branson et al., 1975) was
developed in the context of US military training.  The
intention was to disseminate principles concerning the
development of training programs.  The IPISD model
divided the development of training into five main
phases: analyze, design, develop, implement and
control. Without accurate analysis, it is not possible to
identify the ADM training needs and the content of
training programs required for preventing aviation
accidents.  There are two general types of analysis
techniques: task analysis which is used in training
development for analyzing the knowledge, skills, and
attitudes required by the operator in order to execute
the task efficiently, and error analysis which focuses
on errors in task performance (Patrick, 2003).  Both
analysis techniques can help to identify training needs
and training content.  The first type of task analysis is
described as a traditional form of job/task/cognitive
analysis.  It breaks down work into a series of subtasks
that have to be accomplished in a logical fashion.  The
second type, error analysis, is used to identify where
training can be profitably directed for curing
weaknesses.  Dekker (2001) has proposed that human
errors are systematically connected to features of the
operators’ tools and tasks, and error has its roots in the
surrounding system.  Analyzing incidents or accident
reports can obtain a great deal of valuable information
for identifying training needs for subsequent training
to mitigate human errors.
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
HFACS is a generic human error framework
originally developed for US military aviation as a tool
for the investigation and analysis of the human factors
aspects of accidents.  HFACS is based on Reason's
(1990) system-wide model of human error in which
active failures are associated with the performance of
front-line operators in complex systems and latent
failures are characterized as inadequacies or
mis-specifications which might lie dormant within a
system for a long time and are only triggered when
combined with other factors to breach the system’s
defenses.  These latent failures are spawned in the
upper management levels of the organization and may
be related to manufacturing, regulation and/or other
aspects of management. As Reason (1997) noted,
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complex systems are designed, operated, maintained,
and managed by human beings, so it is no surprising
that human decisions and actions are implicated in all
organizational accidents.
HFACS examines human error in flight operations at
four levels. Each higher level affects the next
downward level in HFACS framework.
• Level-1 ‘Unsafe acts of operators’: This level
is where the majority of causes of accidents
are focused.  Such causes can be classified
into the two basic categories of errors and
violation. Decision-errors are in this level.
• Level-2 ‘Preconditions for unsafe acts’: This
level addresses the latent failures within the
causal sequence of events as well as more
obvious active failures.  It also describes the
context of substandard conditions of
operators and the substandard practices they
adopt.
• Level-3 ‘Unsafe supervision’:  This level
traces the causal chain of events producing
unsafe acts up to the front-line supervisors.
• Level-4 ‘Organizational influences’:  This
level encompasses the most elusive of these
latent failures, fallible decisions of upper
levels of management which directly affect
supervisory practices, as well as the
conditions and actions of front-line operators
(Shappell & Weigmann 2001; 2003 & 2004;
and Weigmann & Shappell 1997; 2001a;
2001b; 2001c & 2003).
Between 1996 and 2000, the Republic of China
(R.O.C.)  Air  Force  converted  from  the  F-104  to  a
series of new generation fighters including F-16,
Mirage 2000-5 and the self-developed IDF.  To
improve flight safety, R.O.C. Air Force Headquarters
investigate the pattern of mishaps annually.  The
findings are that accidents attributable solely to
mechanical failure decreased markedly in the recent
years, but the contribution of human error has declined
at a slower rate.  Jensen and Benel (1977) found that
decision errors contributed to 35% of all nonfatal and
51%  of  all  fatal  general  aviation  accidents  in  the
United States between 1970 and 1974.  Diehl (1991)
following Jensen and Benel’s research found that
decision errors contributed to 56% of accidents in
airlines and 53% of accidents in military aviation
between 1987 and 1989.
In order to improve aviation safety there is a need for
military pilots to be trained in making decisions
related directly to the specific tactical environment.
However, there is no research on the identification of
training needs for aeronautical decision-making
(ADM) and for developing the content of training
programs for military pilots in the R.O.C. Air Force.
This study applies the Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS) for analyzing human
factors accident data from the R.O.C. Air Force.  For
developing effective ADM training programs, it is
necessary to understand the association of decision
errors with pilots’ tools (aircraft), tasks (missions),




The data were comprised of the narrative descriptions
of accidents occurring in the R.O.C Air Force between
1978 and 2002.  In total, the complete data set
comprised 523 accidents in this 25 year period.
Demographic Variables
This investigation analysed each accident using the
following demographical variables.
1. Type of aircraft: the types of aircraft
involved in accidents included fighters
(F16, M2000, IDF, F104, F-5, etc.), cargo
aircraft (B1900, C130, C123, C47, etc.),
and training aircraft (AT3, T34, etc.).
2. Missions: accidents occurred when pilots'
were performing missions that included air
interception, air combat tactics, instrument
flight, cross country, transition, surface
attack, close pattern, test flight, and
exercise.
3. The flight stages in which accidents
occurred included: taxi before take-off,
take-off, climb-out, flight in the operational
area, decent, approach, landing and taxi
after landing.
4. The ranks of pilots involved in accidents
included: cadet, lieutenant, first lieutenant,
captain, major, and lieut. colonel (above).
Classification Framework
This study used the HFACS framework as described
in Wiegmann & Shappell (2003).  The first level of
HFACS categorizes events under the general heading
of ‘unsafe acts of operators’ that can lead to an
accident including and comprises of four
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sub-categories of 'decision errors'; 'skill-based errors';
'perceptual errors' and  'violations'. The second level of
HFACS concerns 'preconditions of unsafe acts' which
has a further seven sub-categories of 'adverse mental
states'; 'adverse physiological states'; 'physical/mental
limitations'; 'crew resource management'; 'personal
readiness'; 'physical environment', and 'technological
environment'. The third level of HFACS is ‘unsafe
supervision’, including 'inadequate supervision';
'planned inappropriate operation'; 'failure to correct a
known problem', and 'supervisory violation'.  The
fourth and highest level of HFACS is ‘organizational
influences’ and comprises of the sub-categories of
'resource management'; 'organizational climate' and
'organizational process'.
Coding Process
Each accident report was coded by two investigators,
an instructor pilot and an aviation psychologist.  These
two  investigators  were  trained  on  the  HFACS
framework together for 10 hours to ensure that they
achieved a detailed and accurate understanding to the
categories of the HFACS.  They then analyzed each
accident report independently. To avoid
over-representation from any single accident, each
HFACS category was counted a maximum of only
once per accident.  The count acted simply as an
indicator of presence or absence of each of the 18
categories in a given accident.
Results
Sample Characteristics
A total of 523 accidents were analyzed.  In these
accidents, 1,762 instances of human error were
recorded within the HFACS framework.  Initial results
found that acts at the level of ‘unsafe acts of operators’
were involved in 725 (41.1%) of instances; the
‘preconditions for unsafe acts’ level was as a causal
factor in 552 (31.3%) of cases; the ‘unsafe
supervision’ level was involved in 221 (12.5%)
instances, and the ‘organizational influences’ level in
the model was involved as a factor in 264 (15 %) cases.
Decision errors were involved in 223 (42.6%)
accidents. The inter-rater reliabilities assessed using
Cohen’s Kappa varied between 0.440 and 0.826, a
range of values spanning between moderate and
substantial agreement.  Fourteen HFACS categories
exceeded a Kappa of 0.60, which indicates substantial
agreement.  Four categories had Kappa values of
between 0.40 and 0.59 indicating moderate levels of
agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977) (table 1).
Effect of Aircraft Type
At the level of ‘unsafe acts of operators’, there were no
significant associations with aircraft type. At the level
of ‘preconditions for unsafe acts’, the associations of
aircraft type with ‘adverse mental states’, ‘crew
resource management’, and ‘personal readiness’ were
significant.  Training aircraft were over-represented in
having ‘adverse mental states’ and ‘personal
readiness’; cargo aircraft were over-represented in
having ‘crew resource management’ problems, even
though the frequency of fighters was the highest.  At
the level of ‘unsafe supervision’, the associations of
aircraft types with ‘inadequate supervision’ and
‘failed to correct a known problem’ were significant.
Training aircraft were over-represented in these two
categories of accidents.  At the level of ‘organizational
influences’, the association of aircraft types with
‘organizational process’ was significant.  Training
aircraft were over-represented in the category of
‘organizational process’ of accidents (see table 2).
Table 1. The frequency and percentage of accident
and reliability of HFACS categories
Effect of Aircraft Mission
At  the  level  of  ‘unsafe  acts  of  operators’,  the
association of mission with ‘skill-based errors’ was
significant.  The ‘close pattern’ mission was
over-represented in the category of ‘skill-based errors’
of accidents.  At the level of ‘precondition for unsafe
acts’, the association of mission with ‘personal
readiness’ was significant.  The ‘close pattern’
Accidents’ Frequency
Percentage, and reliability HFACS Categories
Frequency Percentage Cohen’s
Kappa
Organizational process 76 14.5% 0.593
Organizational climate 4 0.8% 0.440
Resource management 184 35.2% 0.768
Supervisory violation 8 1.5% 0.694
Failed correct known problem 12 2.3% 0.548
Planed inadequate operations 24 4.6% 0.706
Inadequate supervision 177 33.8% 0.826
Technology environment 44 8.4% 0.608
Physical environment 74 14.1% 0.797
Personal readiness 29 5.5% 0.695
Crew resource management 146 27.9% 0.801
Physical/mental limitation 73 14.0% 0.691
Adverse physiological states 2 0.4% 0.441
Adverse mental states 184 35.2% 0.748
Violations 160 30.6% 0.695
Perceptual errors 116 22.2% 0.667
Skilled-based errors 226 43.2% 0.712
Decision errors 223 42.6% 0.675
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mission was also over-represented in the category of
‘personal readiness’ of accidents.  At the level of
‘unsafe supervision’, the association of mission with
‘inadequate supervision’ was significant.  Again, the
‘close pattern’ mission was over-represented in the
category of ‘inadequate supervision’ of accidents.
However, at the level of ‘organizational influences’,
there was no significant association between mission
and categories in the HFACS framework (see table 2).
Table 2. The significant association between HFACS
categories and demographical variables
Effect of Phase of Flight
At  the  level  of  ‘unsafe  acts  of  operators’,  the
associations of flight phase with ‘decision errors’ and
‘skilled-based errors’ were significant.  The flight
phase of ‘landing’ was over-represented in these two
categories of accidents.  At the level of ‘precondition
for unsafe acts’, the association of flight phase with
‘adverse mental states’ was significant, as was the
association of flight phase with ‘physical/mental
limitations’ and with ‘crew resource management’.
The flight phase of ‘operational area’ was
over-represented in these three categories of accidents.
At the level of ‘unsafe supervision’, the association of
flight stages with ‘inadequate supervision’ was
significant.  The flight phase of ‘landing’ was
over-represented in the category of ‘inadequate
supervision’ of accidents.  At the level of
‘organizational influences’, there was no significant
association between flight phase and any category
within the HFACS framework (see table 2).
Effect of Pilot’s Rank
At  the  level  of  ‘unsafe  acts  of  operators’,  the
association of a pilot’s rank with ‘decision errors’ was
significant, as was the association of a pilot’s rank
with ‘skill-based errors’ and with ‘perceptual errors’.
The rank of ‘lieutenant’ was over-represented in these
three categories of accidents. At the level of
‘preconditions for unsafe acts’, the associations of a
pilot’s rank with ‘adverse mental states’,
‘physical/mental limitation’ and the ‘physical
environment’ were significant.  The rank of
‘lieutenant’ was over-represented in categories of
‘adverse mental states’ and ‘physical/mental
limitation’ of accidents.  However, the rank of ‘lieut.
colonel above’ was over-represented in the category
of ‘physical environment’ of accidents.  At the level of
‘unsafe supervision’, the association of a pilot’s rank
with ‘inadequate supervision’ was significant.  The
rank of ‘cadet’ was over-represented in the category of
‘inadequate supervision’ of accidents.  At the level of
‘organizational influences’, the association of a pilot’s
rank with ‘organizational process’ was also
significant.  The rank of ‘cadet’ was over-represented
in the category of ‘organizational process’ of
accidents (see table 2).
Discussion
The category of ‘decision-errors’ at the level of
‘unsafe acts of operators’ has a significant association
with flight phases and rank of pilots.  However, it is
important to keep in mind that the higher levels affect
the next downward level in HFACS framework. It
means that decision errors may be affected by
‘precondition for unsafe acts’, ‘unsafe supervisory’,
and ‘organizational influences’.  This is particularly
true of the category of ‘unsafe supervision’ at level-3
of the HFACS.  This is one of the key factors, for it not
only affects the ‘decision errors’ of pilots, but it also
has a significant association with the type of aircraft,
mission, flight phase, and rank of pilots (table 2).  To
precisely identify training needs of ADM, it is
necessary to look further into the factors underlying
decision errors by applying he HFACS framework.
Although the results showed that fighters had highest
frequency of accidents (342), followed by training
aircraft (111) and cargo aircraft (56), further analysis
found that the training aircraft were significantly
































































associated with ‘adverse mental states’, ‘personal
readiness’, ‘inadequate supervision’ and
‘organizational process’.  The training aircraft have
the highest usage in the Air Force, hence there is time
pressure for maintenance, checking processes for
airworthiness oversight, and instructor pilots may not
have time to provide enough training/supervision.
Training aircraft are operated by novice pilots who
may  not  be  ready  for  solo.   Cargo  aircraft  were
significantly associated with ‘CRM’ because these
types were operating by multi-crew, therefore, CRM
was more relevant for crew to perform their tasks than
in a one-seat fighter.  Fighters were generally
under-represented in the HFACS categories.  The
possible explanation this was that fighter pilots were
mature pilots who performed the most demanding
tasks in all-weathers, such as interception and air
combat tactics.  As a result, they were aware of the risk
and they were experienced and with a prudent attitude.
There was a significant association between missions
and the HFACS framework in three categories:
‘skill-based errors’, ‘personal readiness’, and
‘inadequate supervision’.  Further analysis found the
task of ‘close pattern’ was over-represented in these
three categories of accidents.  The possible
explanation was ‘close pattern’ practicing of basic
take-off and landing skills, was designed for training
the novice pilots to operate the aircraft safely.  As the
pilots were novices with limited experience and
operating skills, if the instructor pilots did not provide
proper training/supervision, sending a novice solo
when he was not ready or had not developed the
psychomotor skills, may have resulted in the above
three HFACS categories being significant when
related to mission of ‘close pattern’.
There was a significant association between flight
phase  and  HFACS  framework  in  six  categories.   At
the level of ‘unsafe acts of operators’, ‘decision errors’
and ‘skill-based errors’ were significantly associated
with ‘landing’.  In the landing phase, precise
psychomotor skills are required to control the aircraft
and occasionally instant decisions and responses are
needed.  At the level of ‘preconditions for unsafe acts’
the categories of, ‘adverse mental states’,
‘physical/mental limitation’, and ‘crew resource
management’ were significantly associated with the
phase of flying in the ‘operational area’.  The possible
explanation was that military tactical training such as
air combat tactics or low altitude tactics with high
physical and mental requirement on the pilots all
occur at this stage.  Pilots needed to pay more attention
to the cognitive demands while flying in the
‘operational area’.  They are required to be in a
heightened mental state to allow for quick analysis of
the dynamic situation to be made followed by swift
responses while under time pressure.  They also need
to have good crew resource management skills to deal
with emergent risks and set the priorities for safety
issues. At the level of ‘unsafe supervisions’,
‘inadequate supervision’ was significantly associated
with ‘landing’.  This was perhaps due to the
instructors in the MOB not providing enough
supervision, providing inappropriate instruction for
landing, or back seat instructor pilots failing to
provide suitable training for trainees.
The pilot’s rank was related to flying experience.
Senior officers normally have more flying hours than
junior officers.  The rank of ‘cadet’ was significantly
over-represented at the categories of  ‘organizational
process’ and ‘inadequate supervision’.  It was perhaps
the junior cadet pilots lack of experience and
competence to deal with high levels of supervisions
and organizational influences, therefore, they were
very vulnerable. The rank of ‘lieutenant’ was
significantly associated with ‘decision errors’,
‘skill-based errors’, ‘perceptual errors’, ‘adverse
mental states’, and ‘physical/mental limitation’.  Pilots
with the rank of ‘lieutenant’ were the novice pilots
(between 200 and 500 flying hours), and at the
beginning stage of conversion from training aircraft
(AT-3) to fighters (F-16/M-2000/IDF).  During this
conversion period, it was the tendency of pilots toward
having a higher accident rate. The rank of ‘lieutenant
colonel (above)’ was significantly associated with
‘physical environment’.  The explanation probably
that it was only experienced pilots whom were
believed to have the ability and the confidence to take
the risky tasks in adverse weather or over difficult
terrain conditions, so the tasks in an adverse physical
environment were assigned to pilots with the rank of
lieutenant colonel (and above).
Conclusion
For 25 years, the importance of aeronautical
decision-making (ADM) has been recognized as
critical to the safe operation of aircraft, as well as
accidents avoidance (Jensen & Hunter, 2002).
Dekker (2001) described that human errors is
systemically connected to the tools, tasks, and
operational and organizational environment of
operators, it is important to clarify the role of decision
errors in pilot’s tools, tasks, experience, and operating
environment in military aviation in order to develop
effective ADM training programs for military pilots.
This research finds pilots at the rank of ‘cadet’
(experience) flying ‘training aircraft’ (tools)
practicing ‘close pattern’ (missions) during the
‘landing phase’ (an aspect of the working environment)
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were likely to be involved in an accident.
‘Decision-errors’ also had a significant association
with the landing phase and lieutenant pilots.  However,
there are many factors at the upper levels of HFACS
framework that will also affect pilots making
decisions. It is important to understanding that junior
pilots are very vulnerable to the decisions and
supervisory practices of senior management
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